A Long Island adviser pleaded guilty to a $138 million fraud that took money from more than 430 investors, many elderly

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Vincent Camarda, a Long Island investment adviser who ran A.G. Morgan Financial Advisors, LLC, pleaded guilty to securities fraud and investment adviser fraud in federal court in Central Islip. The scheme raised at least $138 million from at least 431 investors, many of them elderly or financially unsophisticated, through promissory notes tied to five private equity funds. Camarda now faces sentencing in a case the government values at $160 million, with prosecutors seeking restitution and forfeiture.

How prior Par Funding violations fed the $138 million note scheme

Camarda’s guilty plea did not emerge from a single investigation. Before the current charges, the SEC had already pursued an enforcement action against A.G. Morgan, Camarda, and a colleague named McArthur for alleged unlawful sales and broker-dealer registration violations tied to Complete Business Solutions Group Inc., which operated as Par Funding. That earlier SEC action established that Camarda’s firm had a history of steering clients into unregistered offerings. The pattern matters because many of the same types of investors, retirees and people with limited financial experience, appear in both episodes. Rather than prompting tighter scrutiny that might have stopped the later fraud sooner, the Par Funding matter appears to have run on a separate enforcement track while Camarda continued raising money through a new set of investment vehicles.

The criminal information filed in federal court identifies those vehicles by name: AGM Capital Fund I and II, Omni Diversified Fund LLC and III, Windsor Capital Fund LLC and II, and Wilshire Capital Fund LLC. Investors were sold promissory notes issued by these five funds, and according to prosecutors, the proceeds were not managed as promised. The timeline suggests that enforcement timing, not a fresh compliance review or whistleblower tip, ultimately forced the reckoning. Camarda’s firm, registered under CRD #173292 and SEC# 801-80731, remained listed in the SEC’s public adviser database even as the parallel investigations advanced.

What the charging documents and SEC filings reveal

The strongest evidence comes from two primary government filings. The federal prosecutors in the Eastern District of New York confirmed that Camarda pleaded guilty to both securities fraud and investment adviser fraud, placing the total fraud at $160 million. Separately, an SEC litigation release pegged the offering fraud at a minimum of $138 million drawn from at least 431 investors. The gap between the two figures likely reflects different accounting methods: the DOJ number may include fees, interest, or additional investor losses beyond the principal raised.

Both agencies describe the same core conduct. Camarda used his advisory firm to sell promissory notes while misrepresenting how funds would be invested and what risks investors faced. The SEC specifically flagged that many victims were elderly or lacked the financial background to evaluate the products they were buying. That detail carries weight because investment advisers owe a fiduciary duty to act in their clients’ best interest, a standard Camarda admitted to violating when he entered his plea.

Additional detail appears in the criminal information and related charging documents. They describe how investor money was commingled, how new investor funds were used to pay earlier investors, and how disclosures failed to spell out conflicts of interest and liquidity risks. The paperwork also underscores that the promissory notes were marketed as relatively safe, income-generating products, even as the underlying private funds carried substantial credit and operational risk.

Unanswered questions for 431 investors

Several critical gaps remain in the public record. No court filings released so far provide a clear breakdown of how much each investor may recover through restitution or forfeiture. The $160 million figure cited by prosecutors sets an upper boundary for the loss calculation, but the actual return to victims will depend on what assets can be located, liquidated, and legally tied to the fraud. For many retirees who depended on the promised interest payments, even a partial recovery could arrive too late to repair their financial plans.

It is also unclear how much due diligence, if any, was performed by intermediaries who helped place the notes. The SEC materials emphasize Camarda’s role as an investment adviser with fiduciary obligations, but they shed less light on whether other professionals-accountants, lawyers, or outside consultants-raised internal concerns about the structure or marketing of the funds. If such warnings existed, they have not yet surfaced in public filings.

Regulators have not fully explained why earlier red flags, including the Par Funding violations, did not trigger a broader review of A.G. Morgan’s product lineup. The prior case showed that the firm was willing to push unregistered offerings to vulnerable clients. Yet the promissory note program continued for years, growing into a $138 million pool before the SEC and DOJ actions converged. That lag raises policy questions about how quickly regulators should escalate when they see repeat patterns at the same advisory shop.

For now, investors face a long process of claims, court hearings, and eventual sentencing. Camarda’s guilty plea resolves the question of criminal liability but leaves open the practical issues of compensation and regulatory reform. As the case moves toward sentencing, additional filings may clarify how much money can be clawed back and whether any gatekeepers beyond Camarda and his firm will face consequences. Until then, the 431 identified investors remain the central but least-heard voices in a fraud that turned promises of safe income into years of uncertainty.

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