Two scammers were convicted after impersonating VA staff to target more than 60 seriously ill veterans and steal about $8,300

On Thursday, September 21, 2023, the 50th anniversary of the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs National Cemetery Administration was marked at Quantico National Cemetery in Virginia. A musical prelude was performed by the Quantico Marine Band. Presentation of Colors was made by the U.S. Space Force Color Guard and the National Anthem performed by the Fife & Drum Corps of the 3rd U.S. Infantry Regiment (The Old Guard). The Invocation was made by Rev. Carol Ramsey-Lucas, BCC Chief, VA Chaplain Service. Welcome and Opening Comments were made by Mr. James Sanders, Director, Quantico National Cemetery. Remarks were made by the Under Secretary for Memorial Affairs, The Honorable Matthew T. Quinn and the Featured Speaker was Secretary of Veterans Affairs, The Honorable Denis R. McDonough. A special video message from the First Lady of the United States, Dr. Jill Biden was presented. There was a special acknowledgement of longest serving NCA employees. There were special presentations from the Fife & Drum Corps and the Commander-in-Chief's Guard of the 3rd U.S. Infantry Regiment (The Old Guard), and the U.S. Navy Drill Team. Taps was performed by Eugene "Gene" Russell, Photographer, VA HRA, U.S. Army Veteran. Benediction was made by Chaplain Candidate (1LT) Larry Provost, Army National Guard, with closing comments made by Quantico Cemetery Director James Sanders. A musical postlude was performed by the Quantico Marine Band. (VA/Robert Turtil)

A federal jury convicted two people who impersonated Department of Veterans Affairs staff while targeting seriously ill veterans and their emergency contacts; prosecutors said the pair reached more than 60 victims, attempted 130 fraudulent transactions and obtained about $8,300. The relatively modest amount stolen understates the scheme’s severity because the defendants exploited hospital workflows and information about people in intensive care, turning a moment of medical crisis into an identity-theft opportunity.


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What the jury decided

The Justice Department’s July 13 account says Darryl Lamont Young was convicted on all 14 counts charged and Aqeelah Ngiesha Williams was convicted on 12 counts. Both were convicted of conspiracy and aggravated identity-theft counts, with additional wire-fraud convictions. Young remained in custody and Williams remained on bond after trial. The judge had not yet scheduled sentencing, so the convictions establish guilt while the punishment remains undecided. Any sentence will come through a later court action.

How the veterans impersonation worked

According to trial evidence summarized by prosecutors, Young called a local VA medical center from a county jail. The call was free, and the medical center did not receive the usual announcement that it came from an inmate. After posing as a VA employee, he asked to be transferred to other medical facilities. Young then sought information about seriously ill veterans and their emergency contacts. With that information, the defendants allegedly made three-way calls and claimed a credit or debit card number was needed to deposit COVID stimulus benefits. The card information was instead used to fund jail commissary and calling accounts.

The pair targeted more than 30 VA and non-VA facilities. The scheme succeeded because each participant saw only a plausible fragment: a transferred call, a person using hospital terminology, and a supposed benefit for a hospitalized veteran. Combining those fragments created false authority.

The transfer chain deserves the same scrutiny as the caller. In this scheme, the first VA facility’s transfer made the next facility more likely to trust the call, even though the original caller had not been authenticated. A receiving employee can break that chain by calling the originating office through the facility directory and asking for the named staff member.

Why seriously ill veterans were vulnerable

Veterans receiving inpatient care may be unable to verify calls themselves, leaving spouses, adult children or emergency contacts to make quick decisions. A caller who knows the facility or patient’s condition can sound legitimate even when the caller obtained that information through deception. Hospital and benefits staff also face pressure to help. A request framed as care coordination may bypass ordinary skepticism. Facilities can reduce risk by verifying callers through directories, limiting information to the minimum necessary and refusing to transfer suspicious callers merely because they use agency language.

The VA’s official veteran-fraud resources warn that criminals use personal information and government impersonation to steal money or benefits. A genuine agency employee does not need a veteran’s debit-card number to deposit a federal benefit.

Card information is never needed to deposit a federal benefit. A legitimate agency already has an established payment process and will not route stimulus money by collecting a debit number through an incoming call. That mismatch between the stated purpose and requested data is a concrete reason to stop the conversation.

What families and caregivers should verify

A family can establish one rule before a crisis: no card number, bank login or one-time code is given during an incoming call. If a caller claims to represent the VA, the recipient can end the call and contact the facility or agency through the number on an official website or benefit letter. Cards and bank accounts should be monitored during and after a hospitalization, especially when an emergency contact received unusual calls. An issuer can replace a compromised card and investigate transactions. Credit reports and freezes may be appropriate if Social Security numbers or broader identity information were exposed.

Suspected conduct can be reported to the facility’s privacy or security office, the VA Office of Inspector General, local law enforcement and the FTC’s fraud-reporting portal. A timeline of calls, numbers, names used and requested information can help link reports from different facilities. The convictions show that a scam does not need a vast dollar total to target many vulnerable people. More than 60 victims were approached while facing serious illness. A verification callback through an independently sourced number remains the strongest defense against authority created by a transferred call.

Building a care-team verification plan

Hospitals and families can agree on a callback procedure before sensitive information is discussed. The staff member records the caller’s name, office and extension, ends the incoming call, and reaches the agency through an internal directory. A transferred call should not bypass that check because the first facility may also have been deceived. Emergency contacts can keep a short list of official numbers for the VA facility, insurer and bank. During a crisis, that list avoids searching through sponsored results or relying on a number supplied by the caller. A family password can help with personal communications, but it never replaces institutional verification.

Account alerts should cover card-not-present charges and small transactions. Criminals may test a stolen card with a modest amount before attempting more. Freezing the card quickly can prevent the fraud from spreading even when the first transaction appears minor. Facilities should review how much patient information is revealed during transfers. A caller usually needs very little to create a convincing story for an emergency contact. Limiting disclosure to verified care participants protects both medical privacy and financial security.

The jury’s findings show how process gaps can combine: a jail call without an announcement, a transfer that conferred trust and a benefit story demanding card data. Breaking any one link can stop the transaction before a veteran’s information becomes money in someone else’s account. Training should include a response to urgent benefit stories: staff can offer to route the matter through verified VA channels without releasing patient or card information. Helping and refusing are not opposites; a safe alternative lets care continue while the caller’s identity is checked.

Where reports and records should go

The federal VSAFE reporting service accepts suspicious contacts through its fraud hotline at 1-833-38V-SAFE. That channel is distinct from a medical center’s clinical line and can route an impersonation report without requiring the veteran to continue engaging with the caller.

Facilities can preserve evidence by retaining call logs, transfer records and the name used by the impersonator. Families can add screenshots and card transactions. Those records connect an apparently isolated call with attempts at other hospitals and give investigators a pattern rather than a single unverifiable complaint.

This article was researched and drafted with AI assistance and reviewed against the linked primary sources.

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