FinCEN says it identified more than $8 billion in potentially suspicious wires sent at the direction of foreign agents between 2021 and 2025

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FinCEN, the Treasury Department’s financial crimes bureau, says it identified more than $8 billion in potentially suspicious wire payments sent through U.S. money services businesses at the direction of foreign agents between 2021 and 2025. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent announced the finding on Oct. 30 in St. Cloud, Minnesota, and FinCEN published the figure the same day in Alert FIN-2026-Alert009. The alert is written for banks and transfer companies, not for the people who use them.

Anyone who sends money overseas through a transfer company, a store wire counter or a remittance service is the customer this alert touches, and so is anyone a stranger has asked to wire money abroad. The question for those senders is not what the $8 billion adds up to. It is whether the person receiving the money is someone they know, for a reason they can state in one sentence.

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What does the $8 billion figure actually count?

The alert says FinCEN “has identified more than $8 billion in suspicious foreign-agent-directed payments between 2021 and 2025.” The total comes from FinCEN’s analysis of Bank Secrecy Act reporting, the suspicious-activity reports and related filings that financial institutions send to the government. Treasury’s announcement describes the same total as potentially suspicious wire payments that U.S. financial institutions reported.

The alert states the limits of the number. It calls Bank Secrecy Act reporting “merely tip and lead information” and says the total “may be overly inclusive,” because it can include completed and attempted transactions, inbound and outbound transfers, and cumulative activity. It does not give a count of reports or filers. A report flags activity for investigators and is not a finding that a crime took place.

In the alert’s terms, an agent is a separate business that a money transmitter authorizes to sell its transfer services. A foreign agent can let parties outside the United States collect U.S.-origin funds sent through the domestic company, and the contracts behind those arrangements may allow the foreign agent to direct the domestic company to pay third parties. Payments made at that direction are what the $8 billion measures.

Which patterns did FinCEN say kept showing up?

The alert lists five recurring patterns in the reports it reviewed:

  • Transfers to beneficiaries with no clear business purpose, such as exchange houses in the United Arab Emirates, Chinese commercial banks and trading companies, and East African recipients
  • Volume and timing that do not fit retail activity, including round-dollar amounts and daily transfers
  • Recipients that lack the profile of a settlement counterparty, such as general trading companies or newly created firms
  • Funds sent abroad within hours or days of arriving
  • Foreign agents using the domestic company’s bank accounts as their own, which limited the bank’s view of the activity

The alert adds that “no single red flag is determinative of illicit or suspicious activity.” It also says money services businesses serve underserved populations and are a key channel for international transfers, and that the domestic company and its agent each remain responsible for compliance. Contracts between them cannot shift that liability.

Financial institutions that file a report on this activity are asked to put the key term FIN2026FOREIGNAGENT in the filing. That label is how FinCEN will sort the reports tied to this alert.

Does the alert change anything for a person sending money abroad?

The alert places its duties on institutions, and it contains no instruction aimed at customers. The sector it covers is large: the alert cites about $106.5 billion in U.S. remittances in 2025, a World Bank Group estimate, and a 2018 CFPB assessment that found money services businesses handle more than 95 percent of remittance transfers.

One local rule already reaches senders. Treasury’s January announcement described a Geographic Targeting Order that requires banks and money transmitters in Hennepin and Ramsey counties, Minnesota, to report transfers of $3,000 or more to beneficiaries outside the United States. Bessent also said in October that Treasury has stopped nearly $190 million in funds tied to overseas fraud and returned more than $100 million to U.S. victims.

What does the FTC say about a request to move money?

The Federal Trade Commission’s guide to imposter scams covers the sender’s side of the same problem. It tells people not to send money, cryptocurrency or gold to someone they do not know after an unexpected call or message. It says a demand to quickly move money to “protect” it is a scam, and it lists wires, crypto, gold and cash handed to a courier as the payment methods imposters ask for.

The guide also tells people to talk with a trusted person before acting on an urgent request, and to verify a claim through a phone number or website they already know is real rather than one the caller supplied. Wire requests that turn out to be scams can be reported at ReportFraud.ftc.gov, which the FTC says could help stop a scammer.

Who is asking for the wire, and could that person be reached another way?

Treasury’s alert is aimed at banks and transfer companies, but the first line of defense on a wire is still the sender’s own accounts. Scammers reach money in three ways: through an account a person already has, through a new account opened in that person’s name, or by getting the person to move the money personally. An overseas wire request is the third kind.

“Scam-Proof Your Accounts in a Weekend” is a 13-page guide to ten moves that lock those three routes, in the order that protects the most money first. It explains how to lock bank logins with two-step login, alerts and a verbal password, and how to set a family code word for fake grandchild-in-trouble calls. The guide also includes a first-hour plan for the day a scam gets through anyway.

Lock the bank logins and set the family code word with Scam-Proof Your Accounts in a Weekend →

This article was produced with AI assistance and edited for accuracy against the sources linked above.

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