Federal prosecutors in Brooklyn have charged two members of a money-laundering network with funneling at least $43 million stolen from victims of so-called pig-butchering investment scams through roughly 45 shell companies and 140 company bank accounts. Zhuoying Chen, known as “Jolene,” and Haojie Zhang, known as “Kevin,” allegedly ran the operation from Brooklyn and Queens between 2020 and 2022. According to a charging announcement from the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of New York, the case, filed as United States v. Chen and Zhang (26-CR-205), represents one of the largest prosecuted laundering networks tied to this type of fraud in the region.
Why the $43 million shell-company network matters right now
Pig-butchering scams work by building trust with targets online, often through social media or messaging apps, then directing them to send money into accounts that appear to belong to legitimate businesses. The Brooklyn network allegedly exploited that model at scale. Victims wired funds into accounts controlled by the network, and the money was then layered through dozens of corporate entities to obscure its origin. The sheer number of accounts, roughly 140 spread across multiple banks, suggests a deliberate effort to keep transaction volumes at each institution low enough to avoid triggering automatic compliance reviews.
The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network has published guidance on shell-company misuse that describes exactly this pattern: nominee signatories, layered transactions, and the use of multiple accounts to defeat basic bank controls. Distributing $43 million across 140 accounts over roughly two years would produce average monthly flows of about $12,800 per account, a level that could plausibly stay beneath the velocity thresholds that prompt suspicious activity reports at many institutions. Whether the network’s account-level transaction data confirms that calibration will depend on bank records obtained through discovery in the criminal case.
The alleged use of dozens of corporate entities also highlights a persistent vulnerability in U.S. financial oversight. Shell companies can often be formed quickly, with minimal disclosure about beneficial owners, and then repurposed as conduits for illicit funds. When many such entities operate in parallel, banks may see only small, routine transactions, rather than a coordinated laundering effort. That fragmentation can frustrate both automated monitoring systems and human reviewers, especially when the entities are spread across multiple institutions and branches.
The charges against Chen and Zhang and the EDNY enforcement trail
The indictment, docketed in the federal court system, charges Chen and Zhang with conspiring to launder investment fraud proceeds and operating an extensive financial conduit for pig-butchering schemes that targeted victims across the United States and abroad. According to prosecutors, the pair used Brooklyn- and Queens-based shell companies as the backbone of the operation, opening business accounts, receiving wires tied to fraudulent “investment” platforms, and then rapidly moving the money through other accounts and overseas transfers.
A related civil forfeiture action, Case 1:25-cv-05745, includes a verified complaint with detailed transaction tracing and describes the group as the “Brooklyn Network.” That complaint, filed in the Eastern District of New York, outlines how investigators followed money from individual victims through layers of corporate accounts and into foreign financial institutions. By tying specific deposits and withdrawals to identified victims, the government seeks to seize funds and assets that can be linked to the alleged laundering scheme.
This prosecution builds on earlier enforcement in the same district. A separate case resulted in the arrest of eleven defendants on charges of investment fraud, money laundering, and operating unlicensed money-transmitting businesses. Victim losses in that earlier matter totaled nearly $18 million, and the case documented tactics such as converting large cash sums into cashier’s checks to further distance the money from its source. The Chen and Zhang case more than doubles the dollar figure and involves a far larger corporate infrastructure, signaling an escalation in both the scale of the fraud and the sophistication of the laundering apparatus.
Prosecutors have also pointed to documentary evidence, including bank records and internal communications, that allegedly show Chen and Zhang coordinating deposits, withdrawals, and transfers across the network. A prior EDNY filing in a related money-laundering matter illustrates the type of spreadsheets, chat logs, and transaction summaries investigators often rely on to map out these networks and demonstrate knowledge of the underlying fraud.
Open questions about the 140-account network and what to watch
Several key details remain outside the public record. The indictment does not yet fully explain how Chen and Zhang allegedly coordinated with the operators of the underlying pig-butchering schemes, including whether they had visibility into the recruitment of victims or simply provided laundering services for a fee. It is also unclear how many additional participants, if any, may be charged as co-conspirators as the investigation continues.
Another open question is how much of the $43 million can ultimately be recovered. Civil forfeiture tools allow the government to seize funds and property tied to the alleged crimes, but much of the money appears to have been moved overseas. The outcome may depend on cooperation from foreign banks and law enforcement partners, as well as the speed with which assets were identified and frozen.
The case will also test how effectively banks’ anti–money laundering controls functioned in practice. With 140 accounts and 45 companies involved, investigators are likely to scrutinize account-opening files, know-your-customer documentation, and internal alerts to determine whether red flags were missed or discounted. Regulators and compliance officers will be watching for clues about patterns-such as rapid movement of funds, common signatories, or shared contact information-that could inform future monitoring rules.
For victims of pig-butchering scams more broadly, the prosecution offers a measure of accountability but not necessarily full restitution. Even if the government succeeds in seizing a portion of the laundered funds, distributing those assets through remission or restoration processes can take years. As the Chen and Zhang case moves forward, court filings and hearings are likely to shed more light on both the mechanics of the Brooklyn Network and the broader ecosystem of online investment fraud that fed it.
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David M. Keller is a finance writer based in Columbus, Ohio, covering personal finance and consumer-focused economic topics. He earned his degree in journalism from Ohio University and began his career reporting on local business and economic trends for a regional media outlet. Since then, he has contributed to a variety of online publications, focusing on clear, practical coverage of topics such as cost of living, debt, and everyday financial decision-making.
